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Abstract
Authentication is a key security control for any computing system, whether that is a PC, server, laptop,
tablet or mobile phone. However, authentication is traditionally poorly served, with existing
implementations falling foul of a variety of weaknesses. Passwords are poorly selected, reused and
shared (to name but a few). Research has suggested novel approaches to authentication such as
transparent authentication and cooperative and distributed authentication. However, these technologies
merely focus upon individual platforms rather than providing a universal and federated authentication
approach that can be used across technologies and services. The advent of cloud computing, its universal
connectivity, scalability and flexibility, offers a new opportunity of achieving usable and convenient
authentication seamlessly in a technology and service independent fashion. The approach introduces a
new dedicated authentication provider – the Managed Authentication Service Provider – that is able to
provide state‐of‐the‐art centralised verification of authenticity. However, relying upon such an
environment also introduces a range of technology, privacy and trust‐related issues that must be
overcome.
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INTRODUCTION
There are 6.8 billion mobile subscribers currently in existence many of which are increasingly utilising
smartphones and other devices with a wide range of capabilities. Smartphones are capable of making
telephone calls, texting, surfing the Internet, checking emails, playing games, viewing documents,
transferring money, shopping online and storing confidential information (to name but a few of the
tasks available!). This leads individuals, corporations and governments to rely heavily and prevalently on
computing systems (i.e. PCs, servers, laptops, tablets and mobile phones) for accessing, storing and
processing personal, financial, medical and business information that are often considered sensitive and
confidential.
Therefore, close attention has been drawn to the critical importance in securing them from any
unauthorised access. To secure any system or information, it is crucial that it must fulfil the CIA triad
principles: confidentiality, integrity and availability. In order to maintain the first two, it is paramount for
a system to uniquely identify legitimate users by an effective user authentication technique, which, if
achieved, enables authorisation and accountability. Thus, it is evident that authentication is a
cornerstone of information systems security.
Whilst various methods of authentication exist, they are traditionally poorly served thereby falling foul
of a variety of drawbacks (Clarke & Furnell, 2007). Knowledge‐based authentication has been the
common standard means for user authentication on computing systems, making up approximately 4 out
of 5 of authentication events (CA Technologies, 2012). However, with recent strict password policies,
users are required to remember multiple, complex, longer, recycled, unshared and changing passwords,
which if met would augment security control while compromising users convenience. Token‐based
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authentication seems to solve some password shortcomings; however, they have higher cost and
fundamentally authenticate the presence of the token rather than the individual. Usability also becomes
an issue when the user is required to carry multiple tokens for accessing a variety of services. Due to
these weaknesses, further attention has been placed upon the final form of authentication, biometrics.
They arguably have high availability, strong defence against repudiation and good levels of usability as
the burden from the user to recall passwords or carry tokens is removed. However, it is not impossible
to forge single static biometrics, and the likely need for additional reader devices and their accuracy are
questionable (Clarke, 2011; O’Gorman, 2003).
The problem is further magnified as users are now in possession of an ever‐growing number of advance
digital devices; each one with its own associated security requirements. So, it is apparent that a more
innovative, convenient and secure solution for user authentication is essential. Some attempts have
emerged to counteract the aforementioned weaknesses of traditional authentication including
deploying two/multi‐factor authentication, such as the combination of password and token or
two/multi‐layer authentication. However, these techniques, on one hand merely augment security, but
on the other hand degrade user friendliness. To enhance these solutions, research has proposed novel
approaches to authentication, such as transparent authentication (Clarke et al., 2011), implicit
authentication (Yazji et al., 2009), and cooperative and distributed authentication (Hocking et al., 2011).
Nonetheless, these technologies merely focus upon individual platforms rather than providing a
universal and federated authentication approach that can be used across different technologies and
services. The advent of cloud computing, its universal connectivity, scalability and flexibility (Grobauer et
al., 2011), offers a new opportunity of achieving usable and convenient authentication seamlessly in a
technology and service independent fashion. However, relying upon such an environment also
introduces a range of technology, privacy and trust‐related issues that need to be considered in any
proposed solution.
This paper builds upon existing research on transparent and distributed authentication, with a view of
capitalising upon the benefits that cloud computing offers. The paper then presents the proposed
federated authentication framework within the cloud. A detailed discussion and outline of the future
work is subsequently presented.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Transparent Authentication
Point‐of‐entry authentication, which solely and initially establishes identification of the user at the
beginning of the session but not throughout, has a number of flaws. The vulnerability increases when
the identity of the user has been verified at login and the device is left on for long periods of time. For
instance, 85% of mobile phone users who responded to Clarke & Furnell (2005) kept their mobiles on for
more than 10 hours a day. This can lead to a high‐risk environment in which an imposter targets the
device following a legitimate login. If this occurs and the device is kept on and active, free and open
misuse can be conducted for a substantial period of time. It was even pointed out in the original
specifications for security in third generation (3G) networks that “It shall be possible for service
providers to authenticate users at the start of, and during, service delivery” (3GPP, 2001) ‐ the emphasis
here on authenticating users during service delivery.
Therefore, it is imperative to increase the level of authentication beyond the standard point‐of‐entry
technique. The potential aim is to use more advanced techniques that would enable periodic or
continuous re‐verification of the user without compromising the convenience. All authentication
techniques are considered intrusive as they require the explicit interaction of the user. However,
biometrics can also be deployed in a more usable fashion that allows the samples to be collected
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spontaneously. They cannot easily be compromised, can be deployed in a non‐intrusive manner and thus
eliminate the potential threat posed by social engineering. Thus, the use of transparent authentication
using biometrics would enhance both the requirement for a robust authentication mechanism and the
user’s need to eliminate any inconvenience during the authentication process. For this reason, Clarke &
Furnell (2007) proposed transparent/non‐intrusive continuous authentication using behavioural
biometric techniques. This approach has the effect of moving away from a Boolean authentication result
to a more meaningful and appropriate confidence measure. As illustrated in Figure 1, there is a
disconnect in current authentication schemes that rather assume authenticity wherever an access
control decision is made. However, through more closely aligning the authentication process with the
access control decision, a more reliable and secure decision is made (as illustrated in Figure 2).
Furthermore, the approach also takes into consideration that all authentication approaches are not
equal and they have varying levels of authentication performance.

Figure 1: A Model of Traditional Authentication Security

Figure 2: A Model of Continuous Authentication Confidence
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Transparent Authentication Systems (TAS) has been developed by numerous prior researchers involving
the authors and others. One implementation of TAS, the Non‐Intrusive and Continuous Authentication
(NICA) (Clarke et al, 2009) is a mobile‐based solution that utilised a combination of several chosen
available biometric techniques, which accomplished a performance of below 0.01% Equal Error Rate
(EER). It is capable of choosing individual biometric techniques to verify a mobile user based upon the
configuration of his/her device. For instance, if a mobile device is not equipped with an inbuilt camera,
the TAS will only choose keystroke analysis and voice verification to verify the user. TAS does also
consider the assumption that different services and data require different security provisions. Through
understanding the risk associated with particular user actions and services, the protection level required
can vary from almost none for checking the time, medium for texting, to significantly high for online
banking. The level of confidence is continuously fluctuating based upon the biometric samples captured
which is subsequently reflected on the privileges to access services and applications, enabling the device
to shut down functionality if insufficient confidence exists. Whilst TAS can be appreciated as a
remarkable solution to effectively remove the reliance upon the human aspects to ensure a robust and
usable authentication, its applicability and universality have to be considered as it is confined to a single
device. With every device requiring biometric setup and enrolment, user configuration and
management, risk assessment and continual refinement.
Authentication Aura
The number of individuals having several digital devices to carry and/or use concurrently has increased.
For example, it is a common place for people to have mobile phone (in many cases more than one),
tablet, laptop, PC, and game console. It is likely that similar authentication techniques are applied across
distinct devices possessed by the same individual. The repeated intrusive authentication process for
each device is likely to be annoying and time consuming. To counteract this burden, communicating the
identity confidence between devices would be useful. In the one hand, collective identity knowledge
controlled by the array of secured devices operated by an individual at any given time offers an
opportunity to enhance security and usability. Accordingly, this has led to the proposal of deploying and
sharing the credentials of the individual's devices authentication confidence in a distributed and
cooperative fashion, enabling a near field adaptive security envelope to be established and maintained
around the individual‐ the user’s Authentication Aura (Hocking et al., 2011). Authentication Aura enables
the individual and distinct devices to communicate their own authentication status and confidence, and
hence to establish an accumulative level of confidence.
Distinct devices are likely to employ different methods of authentication as shown conceptually in Figure
3. For instance, a laptop has an inbuilt fingerprint scanner, a smart phone has a PIN number, voice
recognition and an inbuilt front camera, and a PDA has handwriting recognition. If a user has initially
logged‐in to a device by any authentication technique, the established combined confidence can be
utilised to provide specific access to other trusted devices within a close proximity via a near field
communication (NFC) channel. Consequently, the potential case is to acquire consolidating multi‐
biometric samples, which in turn mitigates some of the limitations of uni‐modal biometrics by enhancing
recognition accuracy, security, and usability (Ross et al, 2006). Confidence adaptation and degradation is
applied over the time of missing or error acquired credentials and based on the un/known locales.
Locking the system and asking for re‐authentication would be necessary to re‐determine the users
credentials when an inappropriate level of confidence has been reached.
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Figure 3: The Potential intra‐device relationship and authentication techniques (Hocking et al., 2011)

The approach further improves the level of security being afforded whilst reducing the burden of user
inconvenience. However, the approach to authentication is still disparate, with individual authentication
approaches being supported on a number of technologies. Furthermore, the effective performance
being achieved is highly correlated to the biometric software – a cheap facial recognition will experience
a significantly different level of recognition accuracy to an expensive military‐grade system. It is
therefore not appropriate to merely have devices that supports biometric capture but also recognition
capabilities with a good level of performance. Establishing trust in such an environment is complicated
further. It also requires each device to support the Aura‐framework and thus be capable of supporting a
level of biometric processing, configuration and management.
FEDERATED AUTHENTICATION IN THE CLOUD
With the aforementioned evolution of authentication mechanisms and of digital device functionality, the
necessity for transparent, universal and federated authentication approach that can be used across
technologies and services is becoming more apparent. Federated authentication is similar to federated
identity in that it extends the concept of authentication beyond an organisation or domain like single‐
sign‐on does for federated identity. However, federated authentication is focused solely on the provision
of authentication and not access control (as federated identity is). The concept of federated
authentication is to centralise the task of authenticating an individual to a trusted third‐party. Through
providing a device and service independent authentication approach, the centralised authority benefits
from specialisation, enabling it to provide the most appropriate authentication technologies and
essentially removes duplication as the user no longer needs to enrol on each device, configure each
device and authenticate to each device. Instead, the user has a single authentication profile within the
Managed Authentication Service Provider (MASP), where they are able to manage and monitor their
profile. Any MASP‐enabled device or service will merely send a request to the MASP and be informed of
its current real‐time identity confidence. In this manner, individual devices themselves are relieved of a
5

significant amount of data processing and storage, including a large volume of duplicated activities that
would be occurring with TAS and Aura enabled systems.
Extending the concept of the authentication aura, this approach permits devices and services that are
not biometrically enabled to benefit from stronger authentication approaches. For example, current
password‐based web services, such as Google email, would now be able to transparently verify your
identity – requiring the user to merely access the web page and the background services will check
whether the identity confidence is sufficient to provide immediate access. Obviously in cases where the
confidence is not sufficient, the user would be asked to verify their identity. The system allows for both
device and service‐level authentication. For device‐level authentication, the user is required to initially
install a service that will provide the interconnection between the local authentication
mechanisms/services and the MASP. Once configured at start‐up, this becomes a completely transparent
process from the user perspective – with all future logins only required if sufficient confidence does not
exist. For example, had the user in the morning, logged into his mobile phone using a strong biometric
approach they would, within an appropriate timeframe and proximity as defined by the Authentication
Aura (Hocking et al., 2011), may be automatically logged into his computer or any other device he owns.
The approach can also be utilised on devices the user does not own – providing a web‐service level of
integration. Upon initially connecting to the MASP identity through a web‐based biometrically‐enabled
login, a user will be able to access any of his web‐based services transparently without having to
repeatedly enter his credentials. This can be achieved in one of two approaches:
1. (Preferred) The MASP connects directly to a federated identity system (e.g. OpenID) to provide
seamless inter‐domain single‐sign on.
2. (Optional) The MASP provides a web service credential database (i.e. password store) and
releases the appropriate credentials to the web service if sufficient confidence exists.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the framework incorporates functionality on the device to capture and pre‐
process (if necessary) authentication credentials, typically biometric‐based information. This is a
continuous process depending upon the device, its capturing capabilities and usage – the latter aspect
being key to achieving transparent authentication. Beyond capture however, all remaining processing
and responsibilities are undertaken by the MASP, removing any unnecessary processing and storage
burden on the device. When utilising devices that the user does now own, this also serves to minimise
any privacy implications and the local storage of biometric‐based information.
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Figure 4: A Framework for Federated Authentication in the Cloud

An advantage of a centralised cloud solution is the ability to unify all authentication information,
providing an in‐depth understanding of what the user is doing (in terms of devices and services) and
thereby providing additional identity intelligence of the user. For example, it will be possible to
determine if two authentication requests are simultaneously made from different locations from devices
that belong to the owner or otherwise – thus highlighting potential misuse. The centralised approach
also enables the use of multibiometrics and multi‐factor authentication – providing a robust framework
of authentication models that are stronger than any uni‐modal or single factor authentication approach.
For example, depending upon the available authentication approaches (which themselves will be
dependent upon the devices and technology a user utilises), a variety of multi‐instance, multi‐
algorithmic, multi‐modal approaches exist that seek to optimise the authentication decision. As
illustrated in Figure 5, a multi‐algorithmic approach would enable a MASP to utilise a range of biometric
classification algorithms (each crafted to focus of differing aspects of the problem) and combine the
result through fusion. Typically, cost, processing and vendor‐specific solutions have prevented this for
happening to date and continue to do so. As a centralised authentication service, the MASP, through ISO
standards (i.e. ISO 19794, 19785, 19784) will be in a position to incorporate any and all approaches –
something individual devices would never be able to achieve due to prohibitive costs and processing
requirements (ISO, 2006a, 2006b, 2011).

Figure 5: Multi‐Algorithmic

Figure 6 illustrates a relatively simple multibiometric model that incorporations varying degrees of multi‐
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algorithmic processing and fusion at differing levels of the biometric process. These models would be
unique to the user, varying depending upon which samples are present. This approach to the
optimisation of authentication confidence will provide a very strong indicator as to the authenticity of
the user. For example, as illustrated in Table 1, the use of multimodal systems can result in a significant
improvement in the classification performance (Jain et al., 2005).

Figure 6: A Model for Multibiometrics within Federated Authentication

Classifier
Finger
Face
Hand
Multimodal (Minmax Norm)
Multimodal (Tanh Norm)

FRR at a FAR=0.1%
16.4
32.3
53.2
2.2
1.5

Table 1: Multimodal Performance using Finger, Face and Hand Modalities

The centralised approach also overcomes another hurdle in the creation of effective biometric classifiers
– the availability of impostor data. Many modern classifiers utilise approaches that allow them to train
the classifier to behave according to the valid or authorised user (e.g. neural networks); however, in
practical live systems, the lack of availability inhibits the performance that can be achieved. Often this
data needs to be simulated or created rather than being real user data. Moreover, many classifiers utilise
full sample data, rather than derived statistics (such as a mean and standard deviation), making the
creation of simulated data very challenging. Within a centralised system, anonymised impostor data will
be available to all users for both initial enrolment and template refinement; ensuring classifiers are
optimised.
MASP requirements will be largely dependent upon the number of users subscribed to the service, the
number of active users and thus the volume of authentication decisions it needs to make at any point in
time. With such variability in the level of service demand, a flexible and highly scalable processing and
storage system is essential. Whilst distributed computing paradigms would be a solution, cloud
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computing provides an ideal solution to this requirement – with Platform‐as‐a‐Service (PaaS) providing
an effective model for developing the necessary architecture for a highly scalable and adaptive solution.
DISCUSSION
Federated authentication provides a universal approach to identity verification that can be utilised by
any network‐enabled device or service. Whilst the introduction of such a system has the foundations for
solving the authentication problem – both in terms of effective security and usability – it also introduces
a range of further issues that need to be resolved in order for the system to operate effectively.
First and foremost is the need for users and organisations to trust a third‐party provider with their
authentication services. Fundamentally, to date, this is not a typical expectation and there might become
concern over doing so. However, users already trust service providers with authentication credentials,
albeit not all in one place. Furthermore, federated identity has become widely popular and this is based
on the use of a single authentication credential. Federated authentication will offer a range of
authentication technologies for inclusion within federated identity – extending the concept of federated
identity but more thoroughly confirming the identity prior to the access control decision that is made. It
arguably therefore should not be a complete leap in faith of organisations, but merely a logical extension
of the services that are already being provided. It does however change the paradigm under which
authentication will be performed – rather than a zero‐cost solution as is (incorrectly) perceived to be
cost of many secret‐knowledge solutions, a federated authentication provider will need to charge at
some level for the service it provides (perhaps on a per‐authentication, per‐user, monthly or
organisational‐basis). However, given the nature and scale of the authentication and security problem,
the concept of paying to ensure appropriate authentication security should be more than viable.
With the technology itself, there are a number of areas that need to be further investigated.
Considerations such as the time taken to process and authenticate a sample – in particular the lag
introduced through the network and the potential bottleneck at the MASP. The latter can be addressed
through the cloud and successful capacity planning. However, adding all the additional time lags
introduced in a networked solution over a device‐centric model might reduce levels of acceptability – so
care must be taken to ensure this does not have a serious impact. It is not envisaged to be a major
problem, as the concept of network‐based authentication already exists for devices in network domains,
and we all already login to remote services with the authentication process occurring on the remote
server. Furthermore, the process of transparently authenticating individuals means, the capture and
authentication of those samples will be undertaken continuously throughout the use of a service or
device, not at point‐of‐entry. Therefore the user should not be left waiting.
Further issues surround the use of biometric information. From an end‐user perspective, privacy is a key
factor to consider. The storage, use and communication of biometric samples must be achieved in a
manner that minimises the threat to interception and misuse of the information. The MASP architecture
must be appropriately designed to provide separation and segregation of duties to ensure the
opportunity of access the sensitive data is only possible to specific entities. Operationally, consideration
needs to be given to effectively managing enrolment and template renewal. In TAS systems, they often
rely upon many biometric approaches that are behavioural in nature and thus have features that are not
time‐invariant (as would be ideal). It is therefore necessary to update and renew the template in a timely
fashion to ensure it is a true reflection of the users current set of features. Knowing when to do this and
the implications it will have upon the processing infrastructure (as template creation is a far more
processing and memory intensive task than authentication) is essential to the smooth and seamless
running of the MASP. Bearing in mind, cost is also an important factor – it would not necessarily be
suitable to merely utilise more systems but rather better manage existing resources.
9

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Verifying the authenticity of a user to use a digital device or service has become crucial. Individuals,
businesses and governments undertake an ever‐growing range of activities online and via mobile devices
and unfortunately these activities, services and information are the targets of cybercrimes.
Authentication is at the vanguard of ensuring only the authorised user is given access; however, it has
historically suffered from a range of issues related to the security and usability of the approaches. In
order to provide them with adequate protection, innovative robust authentication mechanisms have to
be utilised in a universal level, so they operate in a transparent, continuous and user‐friendly fashion.
The proposal builds upon existing research on transparent and distributed authentication, with a view of
capitalising upon the benefits that cloud computing provide. An authentication system built upon this
would provide a more secure, user‐friendly, universal and technology independent environment. As this
proposed framework evolves, further research will be undertaken to consider human‐aspects of security,
including the privacy of highly sensitive biometric data and the operational factors that must be
incorporated within the architecture to ensure a usable but highly secure system.
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